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Abstract
This paper describes an application of agent-based
modeling to investigate the effect of a distance-based
transaction cost on trade. Long-distance trade is
rapidly increasing, but may ultimately be constrained
by our ability to move material goods between sellers
and buyers. Unlike information exchange, trade in
material goods is dependent on the price of oil and
vulnerable to future scarcities of oil. In addition, there
are growing concerns about greenhouse gas
emissions from long-distance transportation. Our
purpose in this study is to take the first step in
understanding the impact of a distance constraint on
free global trade using a simple artificial economy. We
use the perspective of agent-based computational
economics to model two different scenarios of random
initial allocations of goods among traders, and
investigate the response of the economy as a
distance-based transaction cost is applied. We show
that a geographically skewed initial allocation of goods
performs poorly, while a more uniform initial
distribution responds in a highly resilient way as the
transaction cost is varied. Underlying this resilience is
the emergence of a stable trade network that has
some of the properties of scale-free networks.

INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of global trade is outpacing
our understanding of the social and environmental
consequences of trade. Trade is conducted
increasingly over long distances and relies heavily on
fossil fuels to transport goods from producers to
consumers [1]. Even perishable products such as fruits
and vegetables travel an average of 1500 miles (as of

a few years ago) within the United States. When
imported foods are added to the mix, the average
distance from farm to the dinner table increases
significantly. Most non-perishable items that we
purchase – from toys to clothes to computers – are
typically manufactured thousands of miles away.
As long-distance trade increases, we are also
witnessing significant increases in the price of oil, and
growing concerns about greenhouse gas emissions
from transportation and other sources. How would
global trade change if some of the environmental costs
– such as fossil fuel depletion and greenhouse gas
emissions – are internalized? Alternately, what would
be the effect of substantial increases in fuel costs due
to increasing demand and decreasing supply?
Concurrently, information technology has become
commonplace in every part of the world. Information is
increasingly available at a low cost in real time, with
possibly a much lower environmental cost than longdistance transportation of goods. Historically, one of
the primary obstacles to free global trade has been the
cost of accurate and timely information, including the
ability to easily find and negotiate with trading
partners.
Electronic trade exchanges and other
Internet-based mechanisms are now beginning to
remove this obstacle. But the ultimate constraint to
trade may well be our ability to physically move
material goods from sellers to buyers over long
distances at an acceptable cost including externalities.
This constraint might lead to a restructuring of the fastgrowing society of global traders, and stimulate new
kinds of trade relationships and networks.
Our purpose in this study is to take the first step in
understanding the impact of a distance constraint on
free global trade using a simple artificial economy. We
quantify this constraint as a distance-based
transaction cost that traders must pay in order to
transport goods to each other. We are interested in

receives at least 1200 units of g1 and no
more than 300 units of g2. Each trader in
the west receives at least 1200 units of g2
and no more than 300 units of g1. The
actual amounts are allocated randomly
such that each trader starts with a total
quantity of 1500 units.

understanding how such a constraint would affect the
outcomes of trade, such as the utility or welfare
extracted by traders and the prices that traders pay for
goods. We are also interested in exploring any
geographical patterns that might emerge as a result of
the transaction cost, such as trade networks with
specific topologies.
We proceed further by building on the substantial
recent research in agent-based computational
economics or ACE [2], which studies economies as
evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents.
ACE relies on computational laboratories to study the
evolution of decentralized market economies under
controlled experimental conditions. It is particularly
appropriate for modeling the profit or utility seeking
behavior of individual traders who are at different
geographical locations with different sets of neighbors
and have varying amounts of goods to trade.

METHOD
We formulate the trade problem as follows,
adapting a simple barter economy used by Wilhite [3,
4]. Our artificial world consists of 1024 traders spaced
uniformly in the four quadrants of a rectangular space,
as shown in Figure 1. Each trader is an agent who
remains at a fixed location, and is able to trade with
others who may be at other arbitrary locations. Traders
are presumed to find potential trade partners and
negotiate the terms of trade through mechanisms that
are independent of their locations, such as globallyaccessible electronic trade exchanges.
Each trader starts out with an initial endowment of
two durable goods, g1 and g2, ranging from 0 to 1500
units each. The two goods suffer no degradation over
time and serve as assets that can be exchanged.
There is no production and the aggregate stock of
goods changes only to account for the transaction cost
as described later.
The initial allocation can follow two distinct
scenarios, maintaining nearly equal amounts of g1 and
g2 in our artificial world:
•

“Globally mixed random” (GMR): There are
no regional differences. Each trader gets
random quantities of the two goods such
that the total quantity of both goods
together is exactly 1500 units.

•

“Local comparative advantage random”
(LCAR): The eastern half of the world has
more g1 than g2, and the western half has
more g2 than g1. Each trader in the east

Figure 1. Location of traders in the artificial world.

Each trader attempts to maximize the same
symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility function, U = g1 * g2.
Traders are rational, non-strategic and myopic such
that they do not plan for future opportunities or mislead
potential trade partners.
Trade proceeds as follows in this artificial world:
•
•
•

•

In each round of trade, traders are chosen
in random order and each trader is given a
chance to initiate four consecutive trades.
The trader then searches the world and
finds the best possible trade partners for
the four trades.
Two traders consummate a trade if their
marginal rates of substitutions are different,
and if the utilities (U = g1 * g2) of both
traders increase as a result.
Trade price between agent i and agent k is
determined by the following rule: Price =
(g2i + g2k) / (g1i + g1k).

•

In each trade, the initiating trader buys or
sells one unit of g1 in exchange for an
appropriate quantity of g2.

verification criteria to ensure that the model is
internally consistent and accurately reflects our barter
economy.

•

Trade rounds proceed as above and
terminate when there are no further
profitable trading opportunities.

As in a real economy, repeated interactions
between individual traders should give rise to
macroeconomic patterns, and these emergent
phenomena should be recognizable. They include
metrics such as trade price, trade distance, and
traders’ final utilities, as well as details of trade such as
the number of trades and the number of searches. As
the unit distance cost is varied, these metrics should
change in ways that should be readily explainable.

In addition, traders take into account a transaction
cost based on the distance between the two traders.
This transaction cost reflects some degree of
internalization of the real environmental costs of longdistance trade, including fossil fuel depletion and
greenhouse gas emissions. This cost can also simply
reflect a high cost of petroleum-based fuels, quite
apart from environmental costs.
In each trade, the cost is paid by traders in
proportion to the quantity of g1 or g2 bought and the
distance that the goods must be transported. The cost
is subtracted from the quantity of goods received by
each trader in a trade. Traders evaluate this cost in
advance and proceed with a trade only if it would still
increase their utilities.
The cost is computed as follows: Transaction cost
= distance * quantity of goods bought * unit distance
cost. For the purposes of this study, the unit distance
cost can be one of the following: 0, 0.001, 0.05, 0.1,
0.15, 0.2, or 0.25. Here, 0.001 would be a very low
cost, while 0.25 would be very high.
We assume that other trade-related activities, such
as finding trade partners and negotiating the terms of
trade, incur negligible transaction costs in relation to
the distance-based cost. This could happen, for
example, if these other activities are carried out over
the Internet and largely automated through appropriate
software.
We have used NetLogo [5] to develop an agentbased model of the simple barter economy described
above. The purpose of the model and the subsequent
simulation experiments is to generate new
understanding and insights about the effects of a
distance-based transaction cost.
Our study of the simulation results starts with a
close examination of the model economy in terms of
macroeconomic behavior. We then investigate other
aspects of the artificial world, specifically the
emergence of trade networks. We characterize the
structure of these networks and extract information
from the simulations to explain their origin.
Simulation results for such simplified trade
scenarios cannot be validated directly against realworld data. Therefore, we have used the following

In addition, the results should not qualitatively
change when critical model parameters, such as the
total population of traders and the maximum initial
allocation of goods, are varied within reasonable limits.
These parameter variations, including variations of the
unit distance cost, constitute a detailed model
sensitivity analysis.
We report results for a single population of traders
and a fixed maximum initial allocation due to space
constraints. Each data point in the following figures
was obtained by averaging the results from three
replications of a particular simulation using three
different pseudo-random seeds.

RESULTS
We present our main simulation results in this
section. Figures 2 through 9 display the salient
features of trade in this barter economy as a function
of the unit distance cost.
Figure 2 shows that the average trade price for the
GMR (“globally mixed random”) allocation is stable
and very close to 1 as expected, since there are nearly
equal amounts of g1 and g2 in the world. The standard
deviation is low and stable as well. The distancebased transaction cost has almost no effect because
traders can easily find trade partners nearby who have
different initial endowments.
In contrast, the average trade price for the LCAR
(“local comparative advantage random”) allocation is
highly sensitive to transaction cost. As the cost
increases, traders have to contend with a shrinking
pool of potential trade partners who may not have the
right ratios of g1 and g2 in the LCAR scenario. Traders
who are situated close to the border between the
eastern and western regions might be able to find
attractive deals across the border, but in general, local
scarcities make the trade price highly volatile and
location-specific.

exceeds about 0.05 (coinciding with the decline in the
number of trades), suggesting that there are
significantly reduced trade opportunities at higher
transaction costs when the initial allocation of goods is
geographically skewed.

Figure 2. Trade price versus transaction cost.

Figure 4. Total number of trades versus transaction
cost.

Figure 3. Trade distance versus transaction cost.

Figure 3 shows that the average trade distance
declines rapidly as the transaction cost is increased.
The trade distance is higher initially for LCAR, since
traders have to look farther for profitable trade
opportunities. But a unit distance cost of 0.05 or larger
makes long-distance trade unprofitable in general and
reduces the trade distance. Above this point, the total
number of trades declines in the LCAR scenario as
seen in Figure 4, while it is nearly unchanged for GMR
due to the proximity of good trading partners.
Figure 5 shows that increasing search effort is
required to find good trade partners as the unit
distance cost increases. In the case of GMR, there is a
modest but steady increase in the number of
searches. For LCAR, the number of searches
increases quickly at first but declines after the cost

Figure 5. Total number of searches versus
transaction cost.

Consequently, the final average utility of the trader
population decreases modestly as the unit distance
cost is increased in the case of GMR, but undergoes a
large drop at about a cost of 0.05 for LCAR, as seen in
Figure 6.

Figure 6. Final utility versus transaction cost.

The final utility for LCAR is about the same as the
GMR scenario when there is no transaction cost,
which demonstrates that unconstrained trade can
efficiently move goods between traders and achieve a
level of utility that is nearly independent of initial
allocations. LCAR does require more searches and
trades in order to overcome geographical differences
in the initial allocation.
As the unit distance cost increases in the LCAR
scenario, geographical differences in the initial
allocation translate into lower final utilities, more
volatile prices, more dispersion in the final utilities, and
significantly more effort to achieve a given level of
average utility. Our model at this point is producing
global economic patterns that are consistent and
rational.

Figure 8. Search efficiency versus transaction cost.

Given that the final utility of the trader population is
an important economic outcome in our trade model,
Figures 7 and 8 show the efficiency with which this
outcome is achieved as the unit distance cost is
varied. In the GMR case, the final average utility per
trade is nearly constant regardless of the transaction
cost, while the final utility per search decreases
modestly due to the slightly increased search effort as
a result of the transaction cost. The trade and search
efficiencies in the LCAR case are much worse,
particularly as the unit distance cost is initially
increased, and then the efficiencies improve at higher
costs.

Figure 9. Environmental efficiency versus
transaction cost.
Figure 7. Trade efficiency versus transaction cost.

Figure 9 shows the environmental efficiency of the
economy, as measured by the final utility per unit of
greenhouse gas emissions, in response to the
transaction cost. We assume that greenhouse gas

emissions produced by each trade are proportional to
the quantity of goods and the shipping distance. The
environmental efficiency in the GMR case increases
rapidly at low costs and then stabilizes at higher costs.
Once again, the efficiency in the LCAR case
significantly lags the GMR case, but shows an
improving trend at higher costs
Having examined the functioning of the economy
under the distance-based transaction cost, we now
turn our attention to the emergence of trade networks.
Individual traders are the nodes or vertices in these
networks, and transactions between traders form the
links or edges.

network structure gels in the first few rounds of trade,
and then the structure is reinforced and remains stable
during subsequent trade rounds. Figure 12 also shows
that the average degree stabilizes to a large extent in
the GMR case for unit distance costs at and above
0.05, which correlates with stability and resilience in
economic performance. In the LCAR case, the degree
changes significantly until a cost of 0.1, and then
continues to change at a slower rate for higher costs.

The GMR scenario for initial allocation of goods
has proven to be highly resilient in response to the
transaction cost. We investigate the reasons by
examining the network topologies for this case. Figure
10 shows the structure of the trade network without
any transaction cost during the first round of trade. The
dots indicate nodes that have not participated in trades
yet. After many rounds of trade, it develops the
appearance of a random network. In Figure 11, we see
a very different trade network emerging after six
rounds of trade under a unit distance cost of 0.05.

Figure 11. Trade network with Cost=0.05 (GMR).

Figure 10. Trade network without transaction cost
(GMR).

Figure 12 highlights the difference between the
networks depicted in Figures 10 and 11. As the cost
increases, the average number of links per node (the
average degree of the network) drops quickly. The
network no longer appears to be a random network. It
starts to form a number of local hubs. Most
interestingly, our simulations show that the basic

Figure 12. Average degree versus transaction cost.

The network degree distribution in the GMR case
for all the unit distance costs is shown in Figures 13
and 14. Without a distance cost, the distribution is
somewhat bimodal, with the second peak indicating
that a significant number of nodes are of high degree.

When a very low unit distance cost (0.001) is applied,
the distribution shifts dramatically to the left where the
degree is much smaller.
For medium and high costs (0.05 through 0.25),
Figure 14 indicates that most nodes are of very small
degree (typically less than 4 links per node), but a few
nodes have a larger number of connections. These
higher-degree nodes become the hubs in the trade
network. The resulting networks resemble power or
scale-free networks [6] but the characteristic is limited
by the small network size. Over 70 percent of the
nodes have at least two connections, suggesting some
degree of clustering in the neighborhoods around the
hubs.
For comparison, Figure 15 shows that the network
in the LCAR case remains random until the cost
approaches 0.15, and then it too exhibits scale-free
properties. The network topology and the economic
performance both stabilize to some extent at these
higher unit distance costs.

Figure 14. Degree distribution (medium and high
costs – GMR).

Our results are consistent with Wilhite’s study [4] of
fixed economic networks, which showed that the
power network is a highly efficient structure that can
quickly redistribute goods without suffering from undue
search costs and produce a more equitable outcome
than many other topologies. Even though we did not
start with a fixed network, the emerged network in the
GMR scenario displays a similar degree of efficiency
for a wide range of transaction costs.
Figure 15. Degree distribution (medium and high
costs – LCAR).

Figure 13. Degree distribution (no cost and very low
cost – GMR).
Figure 16. Distribution of average initial utility (GMR).

Figure 16, which plots the average initial utility
(initial value of g1 * initial value of g2) as a function of

node degree, provides some insight into what causes
a trader to become a hub in distance-constrained
trade. The nodes (traders) that end up with the largest
number of links generally start with low initial utility,
and hence the largest motivation to engage in trade in
order to improve their individual utility. This motivation
to trade makes them local trading hubs for their
neighboring nodes. Some of the traders start with low
initial utility because their randomly allocated initial
quantities of g1 and g2 are very unequal.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our simulation experiments show that a distancebased transaction cost has a significant impact on
trade in our artificial world. We have two important
results in response to the transaction cost. One key
result is the profound difference in aggregate behavior
of this simple economy in terms of macroeconomic
parameters when the method of randomly assigning
the initial allocations of goods is changed. The other
key result is the emergence of trade networks within
the economy.
Without a transaction cost, trade is highly efficient
in moving goods between sellers and buyers. A
geographically skewed initial allocation of goods in the
LCAR scenario produces nearly the same outcomes
as the more uniform (but random) initial allocation in
the GMR scenario. Average trade price is very close to
1, reflecting the equal amounts of the two goods in the
artificial world, regardless of how the goods are
distributed initially.
As the transaction cost increases, the GMR
scenario is affected only to a moderate degree. Price
as well as dispersion in price are nearly the same as in
the no cost case. Even though the average trade
distance drops to less than 10 percent compared to
the no cost case, traders are largely able to
compensate by searching their local neighborhoods
more, and engaging in more trades. In the worst case
(with unit distance cost at 0.25), traders achieve nearly
85 percent of the final utility compared to the no cost
case.
The LCAR scenario produces dramatically different
results in comparison to GMR. Price becomes highly
location-specific, resulting in large changes in the
average price and dispersion as transaction cost
increases. Trade distance starts out higher than in the
GMR scenario because traders have to look farther to
find potential trade partners with sufficiently different
endowments of the two goods, but the distance drops

to the GMR level at higher costs. Traders try to
compensate by engaging in far more searches and
trades in their neighborhoods as cost increases
initially. But then trading opportunities shrink so much
at higher costs that traders ultimately engage in fewer
trades than the no cost case. As a result, the final
utility drops to less than 40 percent compared to the
no cost case.
The resilience of the GMR scenario suggests an
evolved structure of trade relationships under the
surface. This takes the form of a stable trade network
with some of the characteristics of power or scale-free
networks. Traders with low initial utility (due to too
much of one good and too little of the other) are highly
motivated to trade and become local hubs that others
can connect to in each small region.
The hub structure and clustering that emerge in our
experiments (for GMR, and for LCAR at high costs)
are ideally suited for local trade with a small longdistance component. Once such a network has
formed, the final utility or welfare of the traders
depends critically on each local region having a
diverse allocation of tradable goods, as in the GMR
case.
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